within six years and the period 1936 to 1956 constituted a single period, from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War and to the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In any case assumptions of such a narrative collapsed in 1989. Undoubtedly many still adhere to this conventional periodization and see the post-1989 context as one of the 'enlargement' of what was a Cold War inter-state system. This approach relies too much on the European Union's own narrative of its short history and forces a view of European history from the vantage point of the West, with the East reduced to a deviation from a grand narrative that sees in the European post-war project the latest chapter in the rise of the West.
Against such grand narratives of the idea of Europe an alternative approach would give more weight to revolutions in defining the shape and identity of Europe, for revolutions were sites of contestation over modernity and the implementation of its basic programmes. The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-90, which we may term the 1989 Revolution, can now be seen as the formative events that shaped Europe in the twentieth century in much the same way as 1789 did two centuries earlier. In addition to bringing into the picture the Russian dimension of a wider Europe, as opposed to a narrow conception of Europe based largely on the North West, it has the additional advantage of placing modernity at the centre of the analysis, since what was at stake for much of the previous century can now be seen to be rival projects of modernity with entirely different visions of how state and society should be organized. There were essentially four such programmatic models of modernity experimented between 1917 and 1989: state socialism or communism, fascism, liberal democracy, and European transnational governance. Of these the first two failed and the second two succeeded with varying degrees of success. All four were products of Europe and to varying degrees appealed to the idea of Europe for legitimation; they were also quintessentially products of political modernity insofar as they articulated a social imaginary for the creation of political community on new foundations and the reconfiguration of the relationship between the individual, the state and society.
It would be tempting to reduce the course of European history in the twentieth century to national patterns, such as aggressive German nationalism or the catastrophic path of nation-state formation in many countries or to tell the story as one that sees the Shoah as the final destructive outcome of European civilization. Certainly no account of the idea of Europe can omit the 'dark side of Europe', the
